Introduction
The annals of accounting history are replete with discourses in which change represents a central theme. This has been so irrespective of the epistemological and ontological tradition adopted by accounting scholars, though the embrace of differing philosophies on those matters has drawn the gaze of enquiry in a variety of directions. Thus, positivists working within the capital markets tradition have tended to focus on the external drivers which would tend to drive change in accounting practices and procedures in one direction or another (e.g Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) .
By contrast, those approaching the study of accounting from a critical or social tradition have more often approached questions of change from the perspective of the impact of accounting choices made within organisations on those outside those organisations, allowing for the possibility of reflexivity in the process (e.g Burchell et al., 1980 Burchell et al., , 1985 Cooper, 1981 , Hines, 1988 .
In the domain of financial reporting and financial reporting regulation, change is a dominant contemporary theme. The relentless march towards the transition to IFRS based reporting has in recent times gathered a new tempo and legitimacy given the likely embrace of this framework for financial representation by the United States. With the emergence of new prescriptions for practise comes the inevitable cascade of criticism, often based on a priori assumptions as to how accounting procedures should function and as to the results their application should achieve (Nelson, 1973; Wells, 1976) .
Holding aside the potential staleness of debates focused on the relative merits of competing accounting treatments, it is clear that the impact of changed reporting practices or norms can extend far beyond the shape and form of financial statements into the substrate of reporting organisations themselves (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974; Robson, 1991) . Such change may manifest in a variety of forms including in the configuration of matters such as executive compensation arrangements, investment profiles, capital structure profiles, legal structure and preferred jurisdiction of domicile.
At a more primary level, the fact of an externally imposed mandatory rule shift confronts each impacted organisation with the need to embrace technical change in the manner in which information is gathered, processed, subjected to scrutiny and ultimately, promulgated and explained. Yet, as Chua (2007) notes, there are substantial gaps in the accounting literature when it comes to the subject of how accounting is enacted in localized, contemporary business settings.
The decision that Australia would adopt IFRS based reporting on a mandatory basis from all reporting periods commencing January 1 2005 onwards resulted in an inevitable confrontation between practices and techniques which had accumulated and developed under the prior regime and those required to sustain the preparation of financial information and reports under the system. The adoption of IFRS did not visit radical change upon all aspects of the financial accounting and reporting apparatus. This was not so in the case of goodwill accounting and reporting, where almost every facet of prior practice was rendered redundant .
Not only are the IFRS rules in relation to goodwill accounting and reporting far more complex than those they replaced, but goodwill has also become an increasingly material component of the reported asset portfolio of large listed Australian companies (Carlin & Finch, 2008b) . Thus, careful scrutiny of the manner in which firms responded to the requirement that they shift from one goodwill reporting regime to another provides an avenue through which evidence on how organisations cope with the rigours of complex material reporting change may be gathered. This is a question with potentially significant implications for a range of stakeholders including auditors, financial analysts, regulators and report users. This paper reports the results of a study of the goodwill reporting practices adopted by a sample of 50 large Australian listed firms which disclosed the existence of goodwill in each of the first two years in which they produced financial statements pursuant to IFRS. The quality and technical accuracy of the goodwill disclosures produced by these organisations together with an assessment of evidence of variation in these over time provides an evidentiary basis for analysis. The focal question pondered in light of this evidentiary base pertains to the nature of organisational responses to changes such as those brought about by continued development and reform of financial reporting standards.
Bearing this in mind, the remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses the findings of some relevant prior literature and the implications these carry for this study. Section 3 contains details of the research sample, data configuration and research methodology employed. Section 4 consists of an exposition of the results of the study, while Section 5 contains some brief conclusions and suggestions for potential future research into financial reporting and organisational change responses thereto.
Some Relevant Background Literature
It has been forcefully argued that accounting cannot be conceived of as a neutral, technical problem solving procedure (Hopwood, 1987; Dent, 1990) . It follows from this that an understanding of the responses made by organisations to accounting changes cannot proceed solely on an economic or technical basis, though the influence of both sets of considerations may be important (Hussein, 1981; Ijiri et al., 1966) .
The capacity of accounting to actively contribute to the maintenance and construction of organisational forms and orders within which accounting occurs is well documented (e.g. Meyer, 1986) . This implies an important role for accounting and related activities not just in the context of rationalising and legitimating the activities of an organisation for the benefit of outside stakeholders, but as an element of other processes (Cooper & Sherer, 1984) . These may include innovation and more broadly, organisational learning (Comiskey & Groves, 1972; March, 1987) .
While the processes through which accounting effects change and is itself changed cannot as yet be considered to fall within a body of settled knowledge, it is nonetheless possible to point to clear historical and contemporary examples of situations where accounting or accounting choices have changed not just the content of financial reports, but the form of the organisations issuing the reports themselves. A number emerge from the extant research literature.
The domain of acquisition accounting presents an apposite case in point. Prior to 2001, US GAAP permitted use of either purchase or pooling of interests accounting in the wake of an acquisition transaction. Application of the former typically gave rise to goodwill on acquisition, which was required under then existing rules to be amortised against periodic earnings. This often gave rise to the problem of post acquisition earnings dilution. Pooling of interests accounting avoided this transaction, given that it is highly unusual for goodwill to result from an acquisition accounted for in this manner.
However, not all acquisition transactions automatically qualified for the use of pooling accounting. Consequently, where a preference for the use of pooling accounting existed, it would often be necessary to undertake materially costly changes to deal and consideration configuration, even where this resulted in destruction of acquirer shareholder value. The research literature has yielded strong evidence of the existence of this form of regulatory arbitrage, in which accounting preferences caused acquirers to pay more for transactions than was necessary, in order to avoid post acquisition earnings dilution (Moehrle et al., 2000) .
In the executive compensation space, the controversy surrounding the use of and appropriate accounting treatment for employee stock options also usefully illustrates the phenomenon in question. The longstanding lack of a requirement to recognise the expense associated with the issue of stock options to employees is demonstrated not only to have skewed choice away from cash and other forms of consideration towards options, but also to have impacted on factors as diverse as preferred investment project risk profile, dividend policy, capital structure choice and the timing of information release to capital markets (Carlin & Ford, 2006) .
Elsewhere, it is becoming apparent that the IFRS hedge and derivative accounting regime is impacting on far more than the form and content of note form disclosures. Recent empirical work has demonstrated that the IFRS rules have contributed to a decline in both speculative activity using derivative products, but also on the effectiveness of economic hedging, particularly in instances where non linear strategies are employed. This has material consequences for organisational residual risk profiles and ultimately, risk appetite (Lins et al., 2008) .
These examples clearly illustrate the capacity of accounting to drive change in the underlying organic form of organisations. However, accounting rule changes also trigger, of necessity, alterations to the manner in which organisations gather, classify, summarise analyse and report on financial information. Rule changes may also fundamentally alter the type of information organisations require both in order to fulfil internal financial management functions and also to appropriately discharge accountability. Forward looking estimates may be preferred to more objective accounts of past events.
The IFRS rules pertaining to goodwill accounting, reporting and valuation differ radically from those embodied in the reporting framework they displaced in Australia and other jurisdictions which, like Australia, transitioned from a capitalise and amortise regime to an impairment testing based system when they substituted IFRS for pre-existing local GAAP (Carlin & Finch, 2007) . Consequently, the transition from pre-existing GAAP to IFRS represented a considerable technical challenge, both from the preparer and the auditor perspective.
Early evidence suggests that in many cases, Australian preparers and auditors have been found wanting in the face of these challenges, with surprising rates of non compliance with the requirements of new applicable accounting standards, and frequently poor disclosure standards . Similar results have been generated in studies of jurisdictions other than Australia undergoing the transition to IFRS based reporting 2008b) .
However, these studies drew upon data observations only relating to the first year in which sample firms reported pursuant to IFRS. As a result, it may be possible to explain the poor compliance and disclosure quality levels observed in those studies as evidence of teething problems as organisations and their auditors attempt to cope with novel, uncertain and complex rule sets.
This study addresses this possibility by examining a data set drawn from the first two years of IFRS based reporting, based on the premise that were teething problems the source of poor compliance and reporting quality, this should be less in evidence in periods subsequent to the initial adoption period. The data and research methodology employed with a view to generating this insight are discussed in section 3, below.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study focuses on evidence of the manner in which reporting organisations approach and cope with change in external reporting rules. A recent shift in the Australian reporting environment came with the mandatory implementation of IFRS, which came into effect in Australia for firms with reporting periods on or after 1 January 2005. A number of listed Australian companies reported pursuant to IFRS in that year. However, the only organisations to do so on a mandatory basis were those with a balance date of 31 December. These firms represented only a small subset of the Australian listed firm population 1 . Thus, the base data year for this study is 2006, the first year when all listed entities (rather than a subset of them) reported pursuant to IFRS.
The research sample drawn upon for the purposes of the study consists of 50 large listed Australian firms which reported goodwill as an element of their asset portfolios during both 2006 and 2007. The process of construction of the 50 firm research sample proceeded as follows. First, firms were required to be constituent members of the All Ordinaries Index 2 as at 31 December, 2006 and at as at 31 December, 2007. Commencing with the largest of these firms (on the basis of market capitalisation) and moving to each progressively smaller entity, firms were included in the research sample if in both 2006 and 2007 they had goodwill, issued financial reports prepared pursuant to IFRS and denominated in Australian dollars, and were trading enterprises rather than listed asset holding vehicles or trusts. The market capitalisation of the 50 sample firms was $573.6 billion at 2006 and $721.9 billion at 2007 3 , which represented 41.3% and 48.8% respectively of entire market capitalisation of the Australian Securities Exchange
4 . An overview of the firms included in the sample is set out in Table 1, below. 1 Approximately 7% of all Australian listed firms as at December 2005. 2 The All Ordinaries Index is the most extensive index covering the Australian stock market comprising a maximum of 500 of the largest companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. While the All Ordinaries Index is no longer an institutional benchmark index, having been superseded by a more concentrated series of benchmark indices, the index has the largest coverage of all Australian equities indices and typically represents more than 95% of the market capitalisation for Australia (Standard & Poor's, 2004 In 2006, total goodwill across the 50 sample firms comprised $57.353 billion with a minimum goodwill balance of $2.404 million and a maximum goodwill balance of $7,200 million. The average goodwill per firm was $1,147 million. In 2007, total goodwill across the 50 sample firms comprised $69.241 billion with a minimum goodwill balance of $2.484 million and a maximum goodwill balance of $7,163 million. As is evident from an inspection of Table 1 and Table 2 , firms in five of six industry groupings represented in the research sample reported increased goodwill in 2007 in comparison to 2006 , providing comfort that the data used for the purposes of analysis in this study were not primarily captive to large outlier movements. In understanding the response of reporting entities to the stipulations of IFRS and the degree to which organisational responses may have changed over time, several dimensions of the IFRS goodwill reporting regime are of interest and capable of being studied by reference to financial statement disclosures issued by sample firms. The first relates to the role of cash generating units (henceforth CGUs) as the crucible within which the impairment testing process transpires.
Paragraph 80 of AASB 136 requires that for the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill be allocated to each of the reporting entity's CGUs (or groups of cash generating entities) which are expected to benefit from the goodwill. To avoid the creation of an excessive reporting systems burden, this allocation is only required down to CGUs or groups of CGUs which represent the lowest level at which goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes. However, to guard against inappropriate aggregation, paragraph 80 stipulates that the CGUs (or groups thereof) should not be larger than segments defined for the purpose of segment reporting 5 .
This is important, because the number of CGUs to which goodwill is allocated for the purposes of impairment testing itself has the capacity to impact on the likelihood of an impairment loss being recognised. A simple example will illustrate. Contemplate an airline company, X Ltd. This firm operates a highly profitable domestic passenger airline business and an international passenger airline business which exhibits lower average margins and far higher result volatility, under the same brand.
The domestic network operates and is capable of being sustained independently of the international network, and vice versa. If both segments are combined into just one CGU, the consistent results of the domestic portion will tend to smooth the volatility inherent in the international portion -and in consequence, it is likely that a discounted cashflow approach to determining the recoverable amount of the assets deployed by the business will result in greater "head room" over and above the carrying value than would be the case were each treated as an individual CGU.
Thus, in coming to understand the characteristics of the goodwill reporting regime, developing an understanding of the apparent level of aggregation of CGUs as defined by reporting entities is of prime significance. This is pursued by comparing the number of reported controlled subsidiary entities, business segments and defined cash generating units for each firm in our sample. The completeness and quality of disclosures relating to goodwill at the CGU level is also assessed by examining the extent to which each sample firm's total goodwill balance can be reconciled with the sum of disclosed CGU goodwill allocations.
Where the total disclosed goodwill of the firm does not reconcile to the total value of goodwill allocated to CGUs, the quality and completeness of disclosure is judged to be lower than where complete reconciliation is possible.
Having examined the aggregation issue, attention is turned to manner in which recoverable amount of CGU assets has been estimated. This requires reference to fair value or value in use, and disclosure which of these reference bases has been adopted. While it is likely that in most circumstances recoverable value will be determined by reference to value in use, the possibility that the fair (market) value of certain asset classes may be reliably determinable, for example, by dint of the existence of active markets for assets of the class in question, means that it will on some occasions be feasible to determine recoverable amount on a fair value basis.
AASB 136 stipulates 6 that adoption of a fair value approach to the determination of recoverable amount is not dependent on the existence of an active market for the assets in question, but also makes clear the need for some reasonable basis for making a reliable estimate of the amount obtainable from the disposal of assets in arm's length transactions between knowledgeable and willing parties as a prerequisite to the adoption of this method. Consequently, the circumstances in which this choice is exercised also represent an object of potential research interest, and the frequency with which sample firms resorted to either method is reported in section four of the paper.
While AASB 136 calls for limited disclosure of the assumptions and processes used by an organisation which has elected to use fair value as the benchmark for impairment testing 7 , several specific and detailed disclosures are called for in the event that value in use is the basis adopted for the determination of recoverable amount. These appear designed to assist financial statements users to assess the robustness of the discounted cashflow modelling process used to estimate recoverable amount, and include; (i) a description of each key assumption on which management has based its cash flow projections for the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those to which the unit's (group of units') recoverable amount is most sensitive 8 ;
(ii) a description of management's approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each key assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past experience or external sources of information 9 ;
(iii) the period over which management has projected cash flows based on financial budgets/forecasts approved by management and, when a period greater than five years is used for a cash-generating unit (group of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified 10 ;
(iv) the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts, and the justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the long-term average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or countries in which the entity operates, or for the market to which the unit (group of units) is dedicated 11 ; and (v) the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections 12 .
Inspection of the assumptions made in relation to key factors such as discount rates, growth rates, forecast periods and terminal value periods supports the development of a more nuanced comprehension of the degree of conservatism or aggression inherent in the development of value in use estimates, meaning that these are also of primary interest in developing an understanding of the operation of the goodwill reporting regime. Consequently, an assessment of the disclosures relating to both discount rates and growth assumptions made by sample firms pursuant to AASB 136 is reported in section four, below.
In order to generate quality assessments, it was necessary to develop a compliance and disclosure quality taxonomy for both discount rate and growth rate based disclosures. In relation to discount rate disclosures, the taxonomy applied required the allocation of each sample firm to one of four dimensions being "multiple explicit discount rates", "single explicit discount rates", "range of discount rates" and "no effective disclosure".
Allocation of a firm to the first of these categories indicated that the firm was fully compliant with the requirements of AASB 136 in relation to discount rate disclosures, and that the degree of transparency inherent in its disclosures was sufficient to allow an external analyst to develop meaningful insights into the process of impairment testing employed by the sample firm. Firms assigned to this category provided details of the specific discount rate used to discount cashflows for the purpose of impairment testing for each defined CGU, and used varying discount rates as the risk characteristics of CGUs varied.
Firms were assigned to the second category "single explicit discount rate" where they provided details of a specific discount rate for each CGU, but there was no observed variation in discount rates assigned to CGUs, even though CGU risk levels were arguably different. The quality of compliance and disclosure for firms in this category was assessed as lower than that of firms in the first category.
Firms were assigned to the third category "range of discount rates", where they provided details of discount rates employed for the purpose of recoverable amount modelling and impairment testing, but rather than specifying a particular discount rate used in the context of testing for impairment in a particular CGU, simply provided details of a range of discount rates used across a range of CGUs. It is questionable whether this practice fulfils the disclosure requirements stipulated under AASB 136, and it is clear that the quality of this form of disclosure is lower than in categories one and two, above.
Finally, where the degree of information provided in relation to discount rates was so limited that it would not sustain any meaningful external evaluation, firms were assigned to a fourth category, labelled "no effective disclosure". These firms were judged not to have complied with the relevant requirements of AASB 136, and the quality of their disclosures was poor.
In contemplating the quality of disclosures relating to growth rates as required under AASB 136, a similar methodology was employed, with firms also characterised according to a four point taxonomy, anchored at the high quality end by the category "multiple growth rates and periods for each CGU" and "no effective disclosure" at the low quality end. Two intermediate categories "single growth rate and period for all CGUs" and "partial disclosure only" (in that order of assessed quality) filled out the scale.
Because a key focal issue for the purposes of this paper is the change in organisational responses to reporting rules over time, the results of the procedures described above were also subjected to scrutiny for evidence of inter temporal variation. The results of the analytical procedures employed for the purposes of the study are reported in section 4, below.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first issue addressed related to the degree to which firms complied with the requirement that balance sheet goodwill balances be reconciled to the level of goodwill disclosed as having been allocated to CGUs for the purposes of goodwill impairment testing. Previous single period studies of disclosure compliance have reported a small but nonetheless significant proportion of firms as failing to satisfy this requirement.
A similar result is evident in the data drawn upon for the purposes of this study. Further, there is at best weak evidence of variation in this phenomenon between the second and first years after IFRS adoption. This data is set out in Table 3 , below. The next issue examined related to the CGU aggregation phenomenon. Previous studies have concluded that disclosures made by first year IFRS adopters with goodwill were consistent with the hypothesis that reporting entities defined fewer CGUs than required under the standard as a strategy for avoiding unwanted impairment charges. The evidence upon which those conclusions were reached pertained to the number of CGUs defined by reporting entities compared to the number of business segments they defined 13 , and the ratio of CGUs to defined business segments. Data pertaining to these matters is set out in Tables 4 and 5 , below. A number of themes emerge from this data. First, firms failed to comply with the requirement to disclose the identity and number of the CGUs they used for the purposes of impairment testing at the same rate in the second year after the adoption of IFRS as in the first. Second, firms appeared to define fewer CGUs in the second year of IFRS implementation than they had defined in the initial year, an observation consistent with the growth in the number of firms which were seen to define fewer CGUs than segments (see Table 4 ) and with the fall in the mean CGU to business segment ratio (see Table 5 ).
These findings are consistent with those set out in earlier studies, which suggest that the reporting and impairment testing processes designed by firms required to report pursuant to IFRS appeared to have been configured with an eye on the objective of minimising forced impairment charges. CGU aggregation represents one means of reducing the risk of such an event. Thus, a possible interpretation of the data set out in Tables 4 and 5 is that by the second year of IFRS adoption, firms became more attuned to the capacity to avoid undesired impairment charges via the aggregation of CGUs.
There was no evidence in the data of a substantial shift between the use of the fair value and value in use approaches to the determination of CGU recoverable amount. Consistent with earlier studies, the value in use approach dominated in the initial IFRS adoption year, and continued to dominate thereafter. This is evident from the data in Table 6 , below. Inspection of the data yields the following propositions. First, in excess of 10% of sample firms failed to disclose any information relating to the discount rates they employed for the purposes of CGU recoverable amount estimation in both the first and second year of IFRS adoption. This is an extremely basic requirement of AASB 136, yet a surprising number of large, well resourced organisations failed either in their first or second year of IFRS based reporting to fulfil this requirement, or to be brought into check on this matter by their auditors or other stakeholders.
Second, it is apparent from the data in Table 7 that firms continued to either resist the requirement that they define multiple explicit discount rates suited to the characteristics of each CGU, or in the alternate had technical difficulty in doing so. This reduces the quality of disclosures made pursuant to AASB 136, and lowers the capacity of financial statement users to independently evaluate the extent to which values assigned to assets such as goodwill are robust.
Third, while there is some evidence consistent with an uplift in minimum discount rates employed for the purposes of impairment testing, no substantial variation in discount rate selection was evident in the multi year data set out in Table 8 . Recent empirical research focused on the discount rates adopted by Australian reporting entities in their first year of IFRS adoption suggests a downward bias in applied discount rates, potentially as a means of elevating estimated CGU recoverable amount and avoiding impairment charges (Carlin & Finch, 2008c) . The consistency between discount rate data observed in the first and second year of IFRS adoption by the sample studied for the purposes of this paper suggests that this is likely a persistent rather than transient year of adoption phenomenon.
Fourth, though there were individual adjustments to growth rates employed by sample firms in the derivation of their value in use based CGU recoverable amount estimates, the better view of the data in Table 9 , as a whole, is that firms approached questions pertaining to growth in the same manner in the second year in which they reported pursuant to IFRS as they had done in the first year.
CONCLUSION
The requirement that Australian firms cease reporting under GAAP and adopt IFRS based reporting resulted in the need for considerable change in both the form of elements of financial reports and the systems, processes and assumptions necessary to gather together the information required to populate those reports.
While the move to IFRS did not result in uniform changes across the expanse of financial reports and financial reporting systems, some elements of these were profoundly impacted. Goodwill and the assessment of the degree to which its value may have been impaired represents a case in point. Consequently, the nature of the response on the part of reporting entities to such marked and obvious gaps between old and new practices holds the potential to produce insight into organisational responses to accounting change.
With the emergence of IFRS came the development of a body of research literature focused on the efficacy of the new reporting framework, and the nature of organisational responses thereto. One phenomenon documented within that body of literature suggested poor compliance rates and disclosure quality among firms adopting IFRS based reporting for the first time.
However, given that these studies drew upon data only pertaining to the first year of adoption, interpretation of the meaning and the significance of their results was challenging. One possible explanation was that poor compliance, particularly with highly technically dense and challenging provisions of applicable accounting standards, may have been explicable with reference to a lack of technical capacity on the part of reporting entities to undertake rapid reporting change. These results also reflected on the capacity of the audit profession to enforce change where change was required.
Such explanations would likely be less persuasive, however, in the face of multi-year datasets documenting repetition of the same problems. Given that the research samples of this and precursor studies have been constructed to include only large and well resourced organisations, observation of sustained poor compliance or reporting quality becomes difficult to explain on capacity grounds.
Other explanations must therefore be preferred. An alternative view is that the patterning in the data is driven not by a lack of capacity on the part of reporting entities to embrace the changes mandated under IFRS, but rather, an unwillingness to do so. Of course, such an explanation presupposes a lack of hard or bright line enforcement. In this vein, it is notable that despite the existence of numerous obvious breaches of clear and express provisions of the mandatory accounting standard the subject of scrutiny, AASB 136, none of the firms included in the research sample received any form of audit qualification in either 2006 or 2007.
Given their potential commercial sensitivity, it is not difficult to understand why reporting entities might look askance at requirements that they produce detailed disclosures pertaining to discount and growth rates. Yet where to do so in a particular manner is mandated, and surveillance mechanisms designed to enforce compliance exist, there would appear to be little option rather than to comply. The results of this study caste a different light on the issue, and suggest the existence of substantial patches of resistance on the part of reporting entities.
This reinforces the wisdom of avoiding conceptualisation of accounting, accounting rules and accounting change as mere technical exercises. It demonstrates that in the face of required changes, organisations may play more than the role of passive rule assimilation and transmission mechanisms and in consequence, subvert the ideal of a reporting landscape characterised by uniformity and neutrality (Tinker, 1991; Mattessich, 1991; 1995) .
If a viable organisational option in the face of a requirement for change is to fail to take appropriate steps to comply, the assumption of consistency and comparability as key qualitative characteristics of financial statements is undermined, with adverse consequences for the fabric of the financial reporting system.
Whereas the transition to a financial reporting landscape dominated by mandatory technical prescriptions for practice may suggest substantial reduction in the leeway for independent action among reporting entities, the results of this study yield an alternative insight that individual organisational responses to accounting change including resistance continue to represent an important element of the domain of practise. This should represent a matter of concern for policy makers and regulators alike.
